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TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND AT THE GATT
Kabir-Ur-Rahman Khan*
This paper first examines the economic characteristics of the
international market in technology and the legal regime traditionally
applicable to such transactions, identifying the inadequacies of both.
It then deals with the emerging concept of international responsibility
of transnational corporations, placing it in the context of the Uruguay
Round of the GATT. Possible impacts of current proposals, in
particular on developing countries, are also discussed.
The advance made so far towards the implementation of
international norms, it is concluded, can only be sustained by
concerted national and increased regional measures.
Part I
Technology now holds a significant place in international trade1
and to its transfer to developing countries has certain economic
characteristics, which on the one hand necessitate international
regulation and on the other make that regulation manifoldly difficult.
Unlike other products, say a motor vehicle, technology is not
primarily produced for sale2 and its transfer is usually seen in the
B.A. (Agra); B. A. (Hons), (O.U.); LL.B. (Sind); LL.M. (Lond); Ph.D (Lond); Barrister-at-
Law (Gray's Inn, Lond); Senior Lecturer in Public International Law, University of Edinburgh,
Scotland, U.K.
I. United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations [UNCTC], Transnational Corporations
in World Development, Trends and Prospects (New York, United Nations, 1988), chap. XI.
2. OCED, North/South Technology Transfer: The Adjustment Ahead (Paris, OECD, 1981),
p. 19.
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context of trading objectives such as the sale of products or services.3
In transfer of technology transactions, it is the strategy of the
transnational corporation, not the market forces as such, which
determine the terms and conditions of technology agreements. There
is hence no genuine international market in technology as such, as the
transactions are governed by the monopolistic domain of the
technology-supplying TNCs. 4  The weak, often non-existent
bargaining position of developing countries, manifested in a dearth of
relevant information and skill, inadequate infrastructure and small
domestic markets, compounds the situation.
The measures to palliate the imbalanced bargaining position
advocated by the developing countries at international fora, it should
be noted, are not designed to thwart or circumnavigate the market in
technology, but indeed to establish a genuine one.
Another phenomenon adverse to developing countries in the
transfer of technology is the inadequate legal machinery. Until
recently, the international legal system did not provide any
independent principles and rules applicable specifically to international
transactions in technology, as these matters were subsumed in the rules
and principles relating to foreign investment or those dealing with
intellectual property, especially international patent law. The former
is largely based on the rules of customary international law,5 and the
latter on the Paris Convention of 1883.6 Both of these regimes, it
may be noted, predate the emergence of developing states on the
international scene and are primarily devoted to the protection of
property rights of foreign nationals, rather than having any concern
with the productive utilization of foreign capital and technology by
host developing countries.
3. Lowell W. Stele, Proceedings of the UN/ECE Seminar on the Management of the Transfer
of Technology within Industrial Co-operation, Geneva 14-17 July 1975, cited in OECD,
North/South Technology, supra note 2, pp. 20-21.
4. UNCTC, Transnational Corporations and Technology Transfer, Effects and Policy Issues,
Doc. ST/CTC/86 (New York, 1987), chap. 2.
5. See, for example, G. Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment in International Law (London,
Stevens, 1969), chap. 1.
6. S. P. Ladas, International Protection of Industrial Property (1930), passim.
204
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
However, some progress towards improving the legal machinery
has been made during the past few decades. Qualitatively, the new
measures aim at securing fair and equitable terms for the acquisition
of technology, removal or reduction of harmful restrictive practices
entailed in such transactions, and curbing the illicit use of financial
power that transnational corporations may exert.
On the substantive side, these measures aim at securing terms and
conditions which would enable developing countries to make a
productive use of foreign capital and technology as an instrument of
development.7 All this, in short, may be described as an attempt at
establishing international responsibility of transnational corporations
in their transactions with developing countries
Instruments to bring about this change are created or utilized at
international, regional, sub-regional, and national levels, and are of
multifarious forms and varied legal contents. The bewildering
diversity of these instruments and measures can perhaps be explained
by placing them within the international legal system. Public
international law, emanating from express or implied consent of
States, is essentially a law of coordination.9 From its inception at the
Treaty of Westphalia (1648), international law has relied on consent-
treaty-arbitration 0 for the creation of international obligation. With
the profusion of bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions, in the
past three centuries the essential characteristics of the international
legal system has altered little. What has happened, however, is that
the areas of international obligations have expanded and, perhaps more
significantly, the instruments of international accountability towards
better supervision and implementation of those obligations have been
added.
7. See the provisions of the UN Code on Transfer of Technology, UN Doc. TD/CODE
TOT/41 (1983); and for a discussion of the code, K. R. Khan, "The U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology," Science, Technology and Development, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 5-12 (1988).
8. UNCTC, Doc. ST/CTC/86, supra note 4, chap. 1.
9. W. Priedmann, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (London, Stevens,
1964), pp. 60-67.
10. R. A. Falk and C. E. Black (eds.) The Future of International Legal Order (1969), vol.
I passim, and K. R. Khan, "The Law of International Economic Institutions and the Principle of
Universality in the Contemporary International Legal Order," in W. E. Butler (ed.) Perestroika and
International Law (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), pp. 227-243.
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Another reason for the multiplicity of fora and instruments in
dealing with the conduct of TNCs is the prevailing economic precept,
in some cases almost an evangelical creed, of free markets which
make most of the capital-exporting states - home countries of TNCs
- ardent champions of, inter alia, unfettered movement of capital.
While these states are happy to create, and in many cases would
robustly insist on creating international rules and machinery for the
protection of foreign investment, industrial property, and transfer of
technology, they look askance at the very suggestion of creating
corresponding rules and machinery for the eradication of major abuses
that exist or may be entailed in the activities of the TNCs in these
areas." This patently asymmetrical approach is at the heart of the
conflict.
The various instruments can now be briefly examined with a view
to identifying their salient elements and the patterns of regulation they
utilize for establishing international responsibility of TNCs. The
concept of international responsibility in this connection, it should be
noted, in itself is an evolving phenomenon. Two elements of it are
identifiable however. On the minimal and strictly legal side,
international responsibility of TNCs comprises what may be described
as international accountability: for instance, obligations to comply
with the warranties and guarantees they provide in the transfer of
technology agreements," and to pay compensation and be generally
responsible for massive accidents such as in Bhopal, India,13 and
refrain from perverting the judicial and administrative systems of the
host countries in which they operate. In these areas of international
accountability of TNCs, there is perhaps a large degree of
convergence among capital-exporting countries and technology-
receiving developing countries.
The divergence, and indeed discord, revolves around the other
aspects of international responsibility that is related to matters of
11. See, for example, the protracted discussions on the two UN Codes.
12. UNIDO, Guide to Guarantee and Warranty Provisions in Transfer of Technology
Transactions (Vienna, UNIDO, 1990) passim.
13. P. T. Muchlinski, The Right to Development and the Industrialization of Less Developed
Countries: The Case of Compensation for Major Industrial Accidents Involving Foreign-Owned
Corporations (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989).
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positive contribution towards internationally-recognized development
objectives: for instance, the working of patents in developing
countries or the fuller and productive use of technology and foreign
investment generally towards generating real industrial growth of the
host economy. Despite protracted negotiations and an obvious
stalemate in them, significant movements towards the emergence of
positive aspects of international responsibility of TNCs can easily be
identified, but so far largely through national and regional measures.
I. International Level
A. Multilateral Conventions
The International Patent System is primarily concerned with
securing international protection for the economic exploitation of
inventions. The Paris regime, predating both developing countries and
transnational corporations, contains little for the promotion and
protection of public interests of the host countries. A major
controversy centers upon the non-working of patents in developing
countries. Article 5 of the Paris Convention has now been amended,
allowing a bit more freedom to developing countries in issuing
compulsory licenses in the event of the non-working of a patent during
a specified period.14
Another controversy relating to patents has now emerged as a
result of the proposals concerning the "trade-related intellectual
property rights" at the Uruguay Round. Hitherto, it has been
generally accepted that the Paris regime allows a member state to
determine which sectors or specific items are to be patentable.
Numerous states accordingly exclude, in the public interest, for
example, pharmaceutical products. 3  The U.S. proposals at the
GAIT would, if substantiated in an agreement, deprive member states
14. K. R. Khan, "The International Patent System: A Call for its Reform from Developing
Countries," Science, Technology and Development, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 3-10 (1987).
15. UNCTC, National Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations
(New York, 1978-89),passim.
207
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1993
of their sovereign right and would make any infraction subject to
individual, if not international, retribution."6
B. International Standards and Norms
Numerous instruments have emerged from the United Nations
System which are collectively described as the New International
Economic Order,' 7 and codes have either been formulated" or are
in the process of negotiation relating to Transnational Corporations
and Transfer of Technology.' 9  A detailed account of these
instruments is unnecessary for the present discussion, but four points
merit discussion.
First, international trade, foreign investment, and transfer of
technology are recognized to have positive functions in international
economic transactions; that is, in addition to conferring benefits on
specific, related parties they are internationally recognized instruments
of the development of nations. For example, the UN Code on
Transfer of Technology "[r ] recognizes the fundamental role of science
and technology in the socio-economic development of all countries
and, in particular, in the acceleration of the development of the
developing countries." 20 This is the raison d'etre for their holding
such an important place in the arena of international economic
relations and increasing attention in the international legal system.
This is not as heretical as the use of the term "development"
might suggest to some people. In more traditional and prosaic terms,
this function of international trade was recognized in the General
16. One of the elements of the proposed measures would include "Enforcement measures,
including the imposition of civil and criminal penalties, to deter infringements of intellectual
property rights." See UNCTC, Doe. E/C. 10/1990/23 (1990), para. 10(0.
17. For a comprehensive collection of these instruments, see A. P. Mutharika, The
International Law of Development, Basic Docunems (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana, 1978- ).
18. For example, UN, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices, Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 (New York, UN, 1980).
19. For the latest progress relating to the UN Code on TNCs, see UNCTC, Doc.
E/C. 10/199015.
20. Preamble to the Code, note 7 above.
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATI as far back as in 1948. The
preamble of that agreement states in part:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment on a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources for
the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods, 2 ' ....
Reform in the General Agreement, allowing differential treatment for
developing countries, inter alia, was based on the above provision.
Article XXXVI, after reiterating the above provisions of the Preamble,
affirms once again more specifically that "international trade [is] a
means of achieving economic and social advancement."22
Second, these instruments of NIEO, either expressly or implicitly,
question and call for dislodging of a major but false assumption, on
which most of the traditional International Economic Law is based:
all states, rich and poor alike - the United States and Swaziland -
have equal economic bargaining power and, in the marketplace, they
all come out with "mutually advantageous arrangements."' The
rectification of this specious assumption is itself a part of the reform
of the present system.
Third, following from the foregoing points, the instruments of the
NIEO enunciate or affirm international responsibility for TNCs in both
their regulatory and productive facets, basing this, inter alia, on the
principle of good faith - a pillar of the international legal system.24
For example, the UN Code on Transfer of Technology enjoins the
parties to negotiations on the transfer of technology "to observe fair
and honest business practices. "I
21. GATT, Basic Instrumems and Selected Documens, Vol. IV, Text (Geneva, GAT, 1969)
p. 1.
22. Art. XXXVI, para. (e), ibid. p. 53.
23. Preamble, General Agreement, supra note 21.
24. B. Chang, General Principles of lnternationalLawAsApplledBy International Courts and
Tribunals (London, Stevens, 1953) Part 11.
25. Para. 5.1, TD/CODE TOT/4 1, supra.
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Fourth, the codes of conduct provide their own mode of
implementation of specific provisions and principles. At the
international level, this approach was first initiated by the International
Labour Organization for the implementation of its Conventions and
Recommendations.26 The essential elements of this machinery are:
acceptance of a Convention adopted by the ILO, the obligation on the
part of the member countries to report on the acceptance of the
Covenants and the measures taken; examination of those measures and
reports by the ILO; consultation, enquiry; and conciliation in the event
of controversy relating to the instruments concerned.' The operative
concept underlying this system is "implementation" - not
enforcement.
II. Regional Level: OECD
The organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD] has made a significant contribution towards promoting "good
corporate behavior" on the part of TNCs [Multinational Enterprises in
the terminology of the OECD], starting from the Guidelines on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in 1976 and
subsequent Decisions and Clarifications relating to those Guidelines.2"
From the OECD's operation of these instruments, several points may
be noted.
On the substantive side, the OECD Guidelines affirm what may
be described as the co-operative and positive aspects of the
international responsibility of TNCs.
The Guidelines thus state that
Enterprise should:
1. Take fully into account established general objectives of the
Member Countries in which they operate.
26. ILO Constitution, Chap. 11, UN Treaty Series, vol. 15, p. 40-
27. E. A. Landy, The Effectiveness of International Supervision, Thirty Years of I.L.O.
Experience (London, Steven, 1966) passim.
28. OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, The 1984 Review of the
1976 Declaration and Decisions (Paris, OECD, 1986).
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2. In particular, give due considerations to those countries' aims
and priorities with regard to economic and social progress including
industrial and regional development, the protection of environment and
consumers' interest, the promotion of innovations and the transfer of
technology."
Relating to Science and Technology, the Guidelines specifically
provide:
Enterprise should:
1. Endeavor to ensure that their activities fit satisfactorily into the
scientific and technological policies and plans of the countries in which
they operate, and contribute to the development of national scientific and
technological capabilities including as far as appropriate the establishment
and improvement in host countries of their capacity to innovate.)
On the strict application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda,
the Guidelines would be applicable to the parties to the instruments,
but the OECD extends these provisions beyond its member countries.
The Guidelines declare the "common aim of Member Countries [is]
to encourage the positive contribution which [TNCs] can make to
economic and social progress and to minimize and resolve the
difficulties to which various operations may give rise."3" The
Guidelines further recognize that the operation of TNCs "extends
throughout the world, including countries that are not Members of the
Organization." The Members of the OECD thus affirm that
"international cooperation in this field extends to all States" and that
they will give full support to efforts undertaken in cooperation with
non-Member countries "and in particular with developing countries,
with a view to improving the welfare and living standards of all people
both by encouraging the positive contribution, which [TNCs] can
make...." 32  In its report the Committee on Investment and
Multinational Enterprises [CIME], inferring from the above
29. Ibid., p. 13.
30. Ibid., p. 16.
31. Guidelines, para. 2, ibid.
32. Ibid., para. 3.
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statements, concluded that "the Guidelines have a de facto influence
extending beyond the OECD area.""
On the areas in which global organizations, such as the ILO and
the United Nations, have adopted specific instruments, for example
relating to industrial relations'" and restrictive practices," the
OECD has treated those instruments as an elaboration of its own
Guidelines." A similar approach will be taken in relation to the UN
codes relating to TNCs and Transfer of Technology. 7  A
constructive use is thus made of interlinking of global and regional
instruments of regulation.
The OECD experience relating to its Guidelines has successfully
demonstrated that international regulation can be advanced by the
implementation machinery of the code system, as an alternative to
fully-fledged enforcement technique.
HI. Sub-Regional Level: Andean Pact
Decision 24 of the Andean Pact, inter alia, established a uniform
policy for its member countries relating to foreign investment and
acquisition of technology, laying down common criteria for the
acceptance of foreign technology and requiring positive elements of
international responsibility on the part of TNCs. While the generally
deteriorating position of the debt-laden developing countries, and a
marked reversal of international economic cooperation in the 1980s,
have led in recent years to the slackening of the regional cohesion
among the Andean Pact countries, Decision 220 of the Commission,
adopted in 1987, now allows the member countries greater discretion
in selecting foreign investment and technology.3"
33. Ibid., p. 61.
34. ILO, Tripartite Declaration ofPrinciples Concerning Multinational Enterprisesand Social
Policy (1977).
35. The UN Set of Principles, supra note 18.
36. OECD, Guidelines, note 28, pp. 61-62.
37. Ibid., p. 62.




IV. National Level: National Legislation and Regulations
National laws and regulations are increasingly utilized for
formulating and instituting measures for the implementation of national
development objectives in consonance with internationally agreed
norms. From a comprehensive and continuing study of these
instruments39 by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations,
the following points may be observed. First, these instruments
institute a framework of terms and conditions and criteria for, among
others, the acquisition of foreign technology linking these with the
national development objectives. The requirements of registration and
approval of such agreements, and the criteria for the approval of
appropriate agreements, should provide a framework of structural
accountability.40 These criteria, with accompanying machinery, serve
not only regulatory functions but, in an affirmative vein, they aim to
link these measures with the positive elements of development policy
relating to utilization of local materials and human resources and
generally a better absorption of foreign technology in domestic
economics.41
It has been recognized that the sustained use of national legislation
by developing countries has improved the terms and forms of foreign
investment considerably and promoted new forms of investments away
from or in addition to foreign direct investments which, being largely
intra-corporation transactions, are little susceptible to international
accountability. The formation of joint ventures, licensing agreements,
and the unpackaging of technology transactions are some of the
recognized improvements contributed by the influence of national
measures.
42
Of all the measures and machinery available for the
implementation of development objectives in the areas under
39. UNCTC, NationalLegislationandRegulationRelatingtoTransnationalCorporations(New
York, UN, 1978).
40. For example, Ghana, Brazil and India, ibid.
41. These and several other developing countries have adopted such measures, ibid., passim.
42. IECD, Recent Trends in Foreign Investment (Paris, OECD, 1984).
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discussion, national legislation and regulation have perhaps been the
most fruitful.
Part II
The Uruguay Round of the GATT
The current round of multilateral trade negotiations - the
Uruguay Round - at the GA'IT is qualitatively different from all the
preceding negotiations, in that it includes, for the first time, among
others, proposals for international regulation of "trade related" foreign
investment and industrial property rights under the GATT auspices.43
From the perspective of developed countries, the case for
extending much strengthened rules and standards relating to these
areas is logical and substantial. Having entered into agreements
among themselves - through the OECD - to liberalize the movement
of capital in their respective territories," to secure a similar regime
at the global level through the GA'IT is simply an extension of their
earlier measures.
Developing countries, on their part, view these proposals with
serious apprehensions for several reasons. Firstly, with the economies
of developing countries in general, their sectors of capital and
technology suffer even greater disadvantages which necessitate special
nurturing and support of their "infant industries."45 Major developed
countries, it may be recalled, have themselves, when going through
similar stages, robustly advocated and used such protective measures.
One of the more enduring examples is that of the "Manufacturing
Clause" in the U.S. legislation which, until very recently, was a
vehicle for extending protection to domestic workers and thus
43. GAir, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 20 September 1986, in BISD, 33rd
Suppl. (Geneva, 1989).
44. OECD, Code on Liberalization of Capital Movement (Paris, OECD, 1986).
45. One of the classical expositionsand cases for such protection was made in the United States
by Alexander Hamilton; see his "Report on Manufacture" reprinted in W. Letwin, American




curtailing intellectual property rights.' Since the general need for
differential and more preferential treatment for developing countries
is already recognized and written into Part IV of the GATI',47 the
developing countries argue for similar treatment, at the least, in the
proposed areas of regulation.4"
Secondly, the developing countries are very apprehensive of the
fact that the existing legal machineries relating to foreign investment,
settlement of investment disputes, e.g. Washington Convention 1966,
and industrial property regime based on Paris Convention 1883 are
being bypassed. And a new regulatory machinery for these areas,
among others, is now being established within the GATT. The
GATT, primarily based on the precept of resolution of conflict through
consensus and negotiations," is not known as an organization well-
equipped with effective enforcement machinery. Even with the recent
improvements in its machinery for settling disputes, the essential
characteristic of that machinery as a framework of negotiated
settlement has not altered. 50
One reason for invoking the GATT machinery in these new areas,
it is feared, is that, unlike the existing and appropriate machineries
applicable to foreign investment and industrial property rights - both
utilizing the traditional method of peaceful third-party adjudication, the
GATT does allow, in respect of non-tariff barriers (dumping subsidies,
etc.) a thinly disguised unilateral action by an aggrieved party.5'
It is significant that the current proposals relating to foreign
investment and industrial property at the GATT are not being
negotiated under its normal machinery for reduction of tariffs, where
the principle of "reciprocal and mutually advantageous benefits" 2
apply, but they are pursued under the machinery applicable to non-
46. For a Panel's Report and the details of the related legislation, see GAT, BISD, Suppl.
30th (1984).
47. Article XXXXI. para. 3-8, GAIT, ext, supra.
48. See GAIr, Uruguay Round Newsletters, passim.
49. John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GA7T, (Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill
Co. 1969), chap. 8.
50. Idem, Restructuring the GATT System, (London, Frances Pinter, 1990), Chap. 6.
51. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, supra, chaps. 14-16.
52. Preamble to the General Agreement, supra.
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tariff barriers which, as noted above, allows for individual punitive
action.53 One inevitable consequence of this approach is that these
proposals already carry an assumption that the measures in question
are "harmful" and detrimental to free flow of trade. Such an
assumption is an integral part of future regimes emerging from the
present proposals. One specific measure adopted by some larger
developing countries, such as India and Brazil, is especially under
attack. Investment laws of these, and indeed of many other
countries,' contain provisions which lay down certain conditions of
performance requirements - that is, for example, foreign investors
should export a certain percentage of their products in order to utilize
benefits granted in the investment agreements."
During the discussions at the Uruguay Round, the aim behind
these proposals has been evident, as it is reported that "the objectives
of the agreement [on foreign investment and industrial property at the
GATTI] would be implemented through unilateral and trade-based
enforcement measures at national level." 56
Developing countries, on their part, regard performance
requirements, together with other investments measures, as a part of
the constructive use of foreign investment and a necessary instrument
for overcoming impediments both present in their domestic economies
and generated by the international economy.57
A recent case between the United States and Canada before the
GAIT is good authority to refute the contention that an export
performance requirement, ipso facto, is a non-tariff barrier and a
violation of GATT rules. The Panel held that whatever the findings
in this case, being between two developed countries, did not apply to
a developing country for whom special treatment in the GATT is now
well recognized. It further held that the "General Agreement does not
prevent Canada from exercising its sovereign right to regulate foreign
53. See note 51 above.
54. See UNCTC, National Legislation, supra.
55. Ibid.
56. GAT, Uruguay Round Newsletter, Nos. 34 and 36 (1989).
57. S. Gutsinger, "Investment Related to Trade," in J. Michael Finger and Andrzej Olechowski
(eds.) The Uruguay Round, A Handbook on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Washington, World
Bank, 1987), pp. 217-225.
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direct investment." Dealing with the specific contention of the United
States that the measures prescribed by the Foreign Investment Review
Act of Canada, which included provisions relating to foreign export
performance requirements, were contrary to the principles and
provisions of the GATT, the Panel made a clear distinction between
an obligation of contracting party to the GATT to accord non-
discriminatory treatment to foreign products and nationals, and an
obligation to allow a foreign national to operate by unfettered
commercial considerations. The latter is not, as yet, part of a GATT
obligation. The Panel, accordingly, held: "Article XVII: 1(b) [of the
GATT] does not establish a separate obligation to allow enterprises to
act in accordance with commercial considerations but merely defines
the obligation ... to act in a manner consistent with the general
principle of non-discriminatory treatment."58
The Panel's finding clearly rejects the contention that the
unfettered commercial freedom of a foreign enterprise is an essential
part of the international obligation to accord non-discriminatory
treatment to such enterprises.
This somewhat open-ended and national interest-oriented
interpretation of international obligations is also manifest in the United
States' Trade and Tariffs Act 1984, which assigns wide power to the
administration to take punitive measures against a foreign state "who
discriminated against United States' interest. ""
Brazil and India, two countries among the Newly Industrialized
Countries (NICS), have already been recipients of punitive measures
or threatened with such measures. Heavy punitive duties were
imposed against the Brazilian imports in the United States on the
allegation that Brazil, by, inter alia, excluding its pharmaceutical
products from patentable products under its laws, did not provide
adequate protection to the U.S. products.' Similar action was
threatened against India on the contention that it did not accord
58. GATT, Canada, Administration of Foreign Investment Review Act, Report of a Panel, 7
Feb. 1984, BISD, 30th Suppl. (Doc. L/5504), pp. 140-165.
59. For an account and discussion of this and subsequent related legislations, see GATT, Trade
Policy Review, Report of the USA 1989 (1990), passim.
60. UNCTC, TNCs in World Development, supra.
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favorable conditions for the U.S. investment. Interestingly enough,
the U.S. transnational corporation concerned - Pepsi Cola - declared
itself satisfied by the terms offered by India.6'
Conclusion
In order to minimize the adverse effects of the distorted market in
technology and the related field of foreign investment, and to mitigate
some of the major imbalances in their bargaining position, developing
countries have adopted at national and sub-regional levels individual
and joint measures in concurrence with internationally agreed norms.
One of the primary objectives of these measures is to institute
international responsibility of transnational corporations with a view
toward securing structural accountability and responsibility towards
facilitating genuine growth in host country economies. These
measures are aimed at establishing, inter alia, a genuine market in
technology, not thwarting it. The considerable progress made in this
field is now threatened by the proposals at present being negotiated at
the GATT.
The advance made so far by the developing countries need not
however be nullified, as their measures to secure foreign technology
on fair and equitable terms can still be sustained and implemented by
continued national measures strengthened by increased regional
cooperation and supported by international norms. The developing
countries could perhaps also contest the legality of the contention that
the performance requirements and the exclusion of certain sectors -
for example, pharmaceutical products - from the scope of patent
protection are illegal or constitute non-tariff barriers, as there is a
strong case to the contrary.
61. Financlal limes, "PepsiCo urges US to let India off the hook," 25 May 1990.
Subsequently it was reported that the US administration had put off its decision to initiate the
proceedings relating to India.
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